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Openness, Intellectual Property and 
Standardization in the European ICT Sector
1. IntroductIon
Interoperability standards form a key part of the microeconomic infrastructure of 
today’s high-technology industries.1 By facilitating compatibility between products and 
systems,2 interoperability standards scaffold the growth and proliferation of networks, 
both real and virtual3: they enable machine-to-machine interaction (as in the case of 
protocols); permit programs to “speak” to one another (as in the case of interfaces), 
and allow information exchange between different applications and platforms (as in 
the case of document formats or structured data standards).4 
Since networks are becoming increasingly central to the modern economy,5 the 
character of the standards which underwrite them have attracted a growing amount of 
attention. In particular, the eyes of lawyers, economists and policymakers have been 
drawn to the way in which intellectual property rights (IPR) over interoperability 
standards can result in technological bottlenecks, leading to reduced competition 
* Carl Mair is a PhD researcher in law and computer science at the centre for eLaw, University of Leiden, The 
Netherlands; legal researcher at Corvers Procurement Services BV; legal counsel at Dialog Semiconductor GmBh.
1.  GM Peter Swann, DePt. of traDe anD InDuS., the econoMIcS of StanDarDIzatIon: fInal rePort for 
StanDarDS anD technIcal reGulatIonS DIrectorate 21 (Dec. 11, 2000), available at http://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file11312.pdf.
2.  Tim Simcoe, Open Standards and Intellectual Property Rights, in oPen InnovatIon: reSearchInG a new 
ParaDIGM 161, 162-63 (Henry Chesbrough et al. eds., 2008).
3.  A “virtual network” is “a network in which participants are linked together by their
economic complementarity and adherence to common technological standards rather than by physical inter-
connection.” See Richard N. Langlois, Technological Standards, Innovation, and Essential Facilities: Toward 
a Schumpeterian Post-Chicago Approach, in DynaMIc coMPetItIon anD PublIc PolIcy: technoloGy, Innova-
tIon, anD antItruSt ISSueS 193, 195 (Jerry Ellig ed., 2005).
4.  For a general definition of a ‘standard’ which embraces all the above, see Paul A. David & Shane 
Greenstein, The Economics of Compatibility Standards: An Introduction to Recent Research, 1 econ. of 
InnovatIon anD new tech. 3, 4 (1990).
5.  See generally yochaI benkler, the wealth of networkS: how SocIal ProDuctIon tranSforMS MarketS 
anD freeDoM (2006).
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6.  See generally Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting Organizations, 90 cal. 
l. rev. 1889, 1900 (2002) (“While standardization has great economic value in many markets, group 
standard setting also poses some potential threats to competition”).
7.  Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 berkley tech. l.J. 
623, 649 (2002) (“Industry standards often encompass proprietary technology, including technology 
already patented or the subject of pending patent applications. This is not surprising because one would 
expect an industry standard to be built upon novel and nonobvious advances in technology rather than 
upon whatever is available in the public domain.”).
8.  For the patentability of inventions in Europe (and some other third countries) according the European 
Patent Office, see European Patent Convention, arts. 52-57, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 19.
9.  Deriving from the so called “property rule” of IPR. The rule relating to actual damages for 
infringement of IPR is called the “liability rule.” See F. Scott Kieff, On the Economics of Patent Law and 
Policy, in Patent law anD theory: a hanDbook of conteMPorary reSearch 3, 5 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 
2008).
10.  See Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Trea-
ty on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 11) 1.
11.  In particular, during the consultation over the revised European Interoperability Framework, where 
the European Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS) advocated a RF licensing regime for ‘open 
standards,’ see infra note 44.
12.  According to the euroPean telecoMMunIcatIonS StanDarD InStItute ruleS of ProceDure R. 15 (Apr. 
8, 2009), “ESSENTIAL as applied to IPR means that it is not possible on technical (but not commercial) 
grounds, taking into account normal technical practice and the state of the art generally available at the 
time of standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of, repair, use or operate EQUIPMENT 
or METHODS which comply with a STANDARD without infringing that IPR . . . .”, available at http://
www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/Legal/ETSI_IPR-Policy.pdf.
13.  See the leaked letter from the Business Software Alliance (BSA) (composed of, inter alia, Microsoft, 
Apple, Adobe) in the context of the revision of the European Interoperability Framework, http://fsfe.org/
projects/os/bsa-letter-ec.pdf (“We urge you to vigorously advocate the language be amended to include 
an express endorsement of technologies made available on . . . FRAND terms, which will allow European 
innovators who own patents and other . . . IP . . . to participate in standards setting . . . .”).
and the potential for consumer harm.6 The root of this concern stems from the 
uneasy reconciliation of two aspects of interoperability standards: that they should 
both incorporate leading-edge technology7 as well as be generally available and 
accessible for implementation. The aspects fit uncomfortably together because the 
technological frontier is often occupied by intellectual property: ‘inventive’ and 
‘novel’8 technological features which are attractive to standard-setting organizations 
(SSOs) may be covered by IPR such as patents, which provide their holders with the 
right to exclude.9 Though the European Union (EU) has recently issued a revised set 
of Horizontal Guidelines,10 which aims to encourage SSOs to adopt IPR policies that 
mandate licensing on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms, 
a number of European stake-holders (including governments) have advocated a 
further opening up of interoperability standards in the form of mandatory royalty-
free (RF) licenses.11 This tendency to require RF licensing of essential12 IPR over 
interoperability standards has provoked condemnation by some powerful private 
sector software vendor lobbying groups13 as well as by some traditional formal 
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14.  Juan Carlos López Agüí, chairman of the Joint Presidents’ Group (JPG) of European ICT and electronics 
standards bodies CEN, CENELEC and ETSI, reportedly wrote the UK cabinet in response to their new 
procurement policy which mandated use of RF interoperability standards. See Mark Ballard, International 
Alarm Rings over U.K. ICT Policy, PublIc Sector It (May 13, 2011 3:36 PM), http://www.computerweekly.
com/blogs/public-sector/2011/05/international-alarm-rings-over.html (“The definition of ‘open standards’ . . . 
used by the UK government, is on a road towards excluding standards from the majority of the most important 
standards bodies . . . from being used in UK public procurement.”).
15.  For example, the BSA argued against the UK government’s RF open standards definition in their new 
procurement guidelines: “BSA strongly supports open standards as a driver of interoperability; but we 
are deeply concerned that by seeking to define openness in a way which requires industry to give up its 
intellectual property, the UK government’s new policy will inadvertently reduce choice, hinder innovation 
and increase the costs of e-government.” See Andy Updegrove, Do Royalty-free Standards Stifle Innovation?, 
the StanDarDS bloG  (Mar. 4, 2011, 12:23 PM), http://www.consortiuminfo.org/standardsblog/article.
php?story=20110304122357355.
16.  See id.
17.  Throughout this article, “open source” will be taken to refer to “free software,” as well. Technically, the 
distinction between the two is that the latter utilizes only so-called “copyleft” licensing practices and must 
meet the strict requirements promulgated by the Free Software Foundation (‘FSF’). See Richard Stallman, Co-
pyleft—Pragmatic Idealism, Gnu oPeratInG SySteM (Sept. 20, 2011, 8:15:42), http://www.gnu.org/philoso-
phy/pragmatic.html.
18.  See Updegrove, supra note 15.
19.  The term “open standards” is used frequently in political discourse, but seldom defined in a consistent 
way, if at all. For its use in “political” discourse, see, e.g., Neelie Kroes, former European Comm’r for 
Competition Policy, Barroso Comm’n, Speech at OpenForum Europe Breakfast Seminar in Brussels: Being 
Open About Standards (June 10, 2008), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
SPEECH/08/317&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
SSOs.14 The critics of RF licensing argue, inter alia, that by taking the reward 
component out of the IP regime, the result will be interoperability standards which are 
less innovative and less widely-used than standards adopted accorded to a FRAND IPR 
policy.15 Conversely, RF licensing policy supporters argue that although essential IPR-
holders will lose the ability to appropriate value directly from their IP under an RF regime, 
they may nevertheless still benefit indirectly via harnessing the immense network effects 
associated with getting technology to read onto a standard.16 In addition, RF licensing 
supporters argue that an RF regime enables the fuller participation of open source software 
suppliers17 in the market for implementers, which will increase competition and the uptake 
of the standard.18 
At least part of the debate over IPR and interoperability standards centres around which 
approach to IP licensing deserves to wear the epithet, ‘open standards’—a term of art with 
no fixed meaning but which carries strong political force.19 While it is not the purpose of 
this essay to vindicate a definition of ‘open standards’ which is royalty-free, this essay 
aims to apply pressure to one key argument of FRAND licensing supporters against RF 
interoperability standards: that RF standards are necessarily less innovative than their 
royalty-bearing equivalents. However, at the same time as supporting the notion that RF 
standards may be as innovative as their FRAND equivalents, this essay will also highlight 
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20.  These effects are divided into two categories: “direct” and “indirect.” Direct network effects are 
predominantly a feature of real networks, and occur when users are identified with components, and simply 
means that the utility any adopter derives from a network is an increasing function of the number of adopters. 
Indirect network effects are simply the positive effects which the development of the downstream markets 
for complementary products (and services) have on the upstream technical platform. See generally Nicolas 
Economides, Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction, in the new econoMy anD beyonD: 
PaSt, PreSent anD future 96 (Dennis W. Jansen ed., 2006).
21.  According to Tom Cottrell, the Japanese computer software industry’s failure to settle on a single standard 
(as compared to the dominant “Wintel” standard of the US and Europe) contributed towards its slow pace of 
innovation in the 1980s-1990s. See Tom Cottrell, Fragmented Standards and the Development of Japan’s Mi-
crocomputer Software Industry, 23 reS. Pol’y 143 (1994).
22.  See Langlois, supra note 3, at 37.
23.  According to Annabelle Gawer (quoting West), a “platform is an architecture of related standards . . . .” 
See Annabelle Gawer, Towards a General Theory of Technological Platforms 13 (2010) (unpublished paper), 
available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=501981&cf=43.
24.  See Langlois, supra note 3, at 37.
25.  See the already mentioned example of the Japanese software industry in 1980s-1990s. See generally Cot-
trell, supra note 21.
their increased vulnerability to patent litigation from companies excluded by a royalty-free 
IPR licensing policy, such as pure IP companies. This essay will conclude that ‘openness’ 
comes at a cost and that stake-holders must be prepared to fight both strategically in terms 
of IP management and perhaps also on a policy-level for changes to the patent system 
generally. 
These arguments will be structured in the following framework. Part 2 will begin by 
providing a brief background to the issues, including a short summary of the positions 
of SSOs, Member State public procurers, and the open source software community. Part 
3 will then attempt to show how SSOs with an RF IPR licensing policy can still attract 
participants, including significant holders of relevant IP, in order to produce innovative 
standards. Part 4 will outline the risks associated with a RF IPR policy, focusing mainly 
on the challenges brought about by decreased participation in standard-setting. Part 5 
will briefly outline some potential remedies to these challenges, as well as some policy 
considerations. Part 6 will conclude. 
2. Background
From a competition policy perspective, an interoperability standard is simply a 
technological feature—or set of features—which competitors have agreed to not compete 
on in order to share in the “network effects”20 and economies of scale associated with 
the existence of a single dominant standard.21 The benefits of a single dominant standard 
accrue on both the demand and supply sides simultaneously22: software suppliers reduce 
costs by focusing their production on a single platform23; meanwhile, consumers benefit 
“from a large installed base that generates lots of software and other complementary goods 
and services.”24 While fragmented standards have been shown to retard innovation,25 
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26.  See Swann, supra note 1, at 21.
27.  For example, VITA (VMEbus International Trade Association) has a mandatory (F)RAND IPR policy 
combined with compulsory essential patent disclosures. See Disclosure and Licensing of Patents in Standards, 
VITA, http://www.vita.com/home/VSO/Disclosure2011.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
28.  ETSI ‘encourages’ FRAND licensing of essential IPR. See ETSI Guide on IPRs, Sec, 2.1.1 (Jan. 25, 
2007), available at http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/Legal/ETSI_Guide_on_IPRs.pdf, section 2.1.1
(“Members are encouraged to make general IPR undertakings/declarations that they will make licenses 
available for all their IPRs under FRAND terms and conditions related to a specific standardization area and 
then, as soon as feasible, provide (or refine) detailed disclosures.”).
29.  ETSI, Resolution GSC-13/22, 23-25, (IPRWG) Intellectual Property Rights Policy (Revised) (Sept. 2008), 
available at http://tinyurl.com/cnuwhox.
30.  Including most of the national standardization bodies from Asia, North America, and the EU.
31.  See ETSI, supra note 29.
32.  Id.
33.  Id.
cooperatively-set interoperability standards are key innovation-enablers in today’s high-
technology industries by, inter alia, giving companies’ R&D expenditures an important 
degree of certainty in what is otherwise a highly uncertain and dynamic world.26 
Given their pivotal role as technological infrastructure, interoperability standards have 
the potential to become innovation choke points if IPR over them are abused in order to 
exclude competitors or to charge “excessive prices.” To this end, both SSOs and public 
sector procurers aim to regulate the exercise of IPRs in some way. SSOs do this by 
requiring their members to sign up to their IPR policies. These policies usually include 
a duty to declare ex ante during standard formation any essential IPR over a standard as 
well as either mandating or requesting commitments on how the IPR will be exercised ex 
post in the market.
 2.1 Formal and Informal SSOs IPR Policies
In the case of formal SSOs, these commitments usually entail FRAND licensing of 
essential IPR, which may either be binding27 or simply a request to do so.28 Formal SSOs 
have publically repudiated the notion that standards should be mandatorily licensed on 
a royalty-free basis.29 The Global Standards Collaboration (GSC)—an international 
body comprised of the major SSOs from all over the world30—adopted a resolution 
(Resolution GSC-13/22) condemning mandatory RF IPR licensing31. The GSC observed, 
“[T]hat there is a trend in some user communities and some standards development 
organizations in support of patent policies which enforce compensation-free provisions 
for standards implementers with respect to SSO IPR policies.”32 The GSC then resolved 
to: strongly voice their opposition to policies that mandate compensation-free licensing provisions33 
In contrast to formal SSOs, informal SSOs such as fora and consortia, however—and 
mainly in the context of the Web and the Internet—tend to adopt either non-proprietary 
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34.  See Worldwide Web Consortium (W3C), W3C Patent Policy (Feb. 5, 2004), http://www.w3.org/Consor-
tium/Patent-Policy-20040205/; see also Network Working Group, Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Tech-
nology (Mar. 2005), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3979.txt.
35.  See Tim Berners-Lee (head of W3C and inventor of the Web), Long Live the Web: A Call for Contin-
ued Open Standards and Neutrality, ScI. aM. (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.
cfm?id=long-live-the-web.
36.  See U.K. Cabinet, Procurement Policy Note, Use of Open Standards When Specifying ICT Requirements, 
Action Note 3/11 31 (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/PPN%20
3_11%20Open%20Standards.pdf. However, this policy has since been retracted, and a public consultation on 
the definition of ‘open standards’ is currently underway. See U.K. Cabinet, Procurement Policy Note, Open 
Standards When Specifying IP, Information Note 09/11 (Nov. 30, 2011), available at http://www.cabinetoffice.
gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/20111130_PPN%2009_11%20Open%20Standards.pdf.
37.  See U.K. Cabinet, Procurement Policy Note, Use of Open Standards When Specifying ICT Requirements, 
supra note 36, at background point 4.
standards or standards adopted according to policies mandating RF licensing.34 According 
to Tim Berners-Lee, the current head of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), and 
inventor of the Web: 
Open, royalty-free standards that are easy to use create the diverse richness 
of Web sites . . . . Openness also means you can build your own Web site 
or company without anyone’s approval. When the Web began, I did not 
have to obtain permission or pay royalties to use the Internet’s own open 
standards, such as the well-known transmission control protocol and internet 
protocol (TCP/IP). Similarly, the Web Consortium’s royalty-free patent 
policy says that the companies, universities and individuals who contribute 
to the development of a standard must agree they will not charge royalties to 
anyone who may use the standard.35
 2.2. Member State Public Procurement IPR Policies
In the context of public procurement, Member States often also set criteria for what 
standards can be accepted as part of the software they procure. Increasingly, Member States 
are opting for standards which are licensed on a RF basis, as the recent highly controversial 
example of the United Kingdom procurement policy demonstrates.36
The reasons for Member States to adopt RF IPR licensing policies with respect to the 
standards implemented in the software they procure generally relate to the following 
concerns:
Government assets should be interoperable and open for re-use in order 
to maximise return on investment, avoid technological lock-in, reduce 
operational risk in ICT projects and provide responsive services for citizens 
and businesses.37
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38.  Id.
39.  As in the case of the German foreign office, which was “forced” after some experimentation with 
some open source software providers, to revert back to Microsoft due to “interoperability problems.” 
See Gijs Hillenius, DE: Interoperability Forces Foreign Office to Proprietary Desktop, euroPean coM-
MISSIon JoInuP (May 11, 2011), http://www.osor.eu/news/de-interoperability-forces-foreign-office-to-
proprietary-desktop.
40.  See MInIStry of econ. affaIrS, The Netherlands in Open Connection: An Action Plan for the Use of 
Open Standards and Open Source Software in the Public and Semi-Public Sectors 6, (Nov. 2007), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/ostp/opengov_inbox/nl-in-open-connection.pdf.
41.  Not all. For example, the permissive BSD and MIT licenses would have no such conflict.
42.  See Richard Stallman, President of Free Software Foundation, Address at the 2nd International 
GPLv3 Conference, Presentation Section: The “Liberty or Death” Clause, the Main Change from v1 
to v2 (Apr. 21, 2006), available at http://fsfe.org/projects/gplv3/fisl-rms-transcript.en.html#liberty-or-
death.
43.  Section 7, GNU General Public License v2.0, Gnu oPeratInG SySteM (June 1991), http://www.gnu.
org/licenses/gpl-2.0.html. (“If, as a consequence of a court judgment or allegation of patent infringement 
or for any other reason (not limited to patent issues), conditions are imposed on you . . . they do not 
excuse you from the conditions of this License. If you cannot distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously 
your obligations under this License and any other pertinent obligations, then as a consequence you 
may not distribute the Program at all. For example, if a patent license would not permit royalty-free 
redistribution of the Program by all those who receive copies directly or indirectly through you, then the 
only way you could satisfy both it and this License would be to refrain entirely from distribution of the 
Program.”).
The three most important goals are interoperability (in the sense of data exchange 
between citizens, businesses and other government departments); re-use (i.e. that the 
standard will continue to be supported in the future); and the avoidance of lock-in (i.e. 
that there are a diversity of software suppliers able to implement the standard).38 The last 
issue of lock-in has been one of real concern for Member State government departments 
who have often found themselves unable to switch from their current (usually Microsoft-
based) information systems to competing systems (often open source), due to lack of 
interoperability.39 Indeed, many Member State procurement policies expressly mention that 
royalty-free “open standards” are required in order to permit open source software suppliers 
to make use of them as well.40 
 2.3 Interoperability Standards and Open Source Software Implementation
The inability of some41 open source software to implement royalty-bearing 
interoperability standards derives from restrictive licensing terms in certain open source 
licenses. In particular, the GNU General Public License (GPL) family of licenses are 
incompatible with any royalty-bearing conditions which attach to interoperability standards. 
The specific clause is found at section 7 of the GPL v2, and has been nick-named, the 
“Liberty or Death clause.”42 For good reason: any extra restrictions such as patent royalties 
which prevent users from exercising the freedoms in the license remove the right to 
continued distribution of the software.43 
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44.  Although the percentage of open source projects licensed under the GPL-family of licenses is apparently in 
the decline, it still covers around 65% of such projects. See Matthew Broersma, Study: GPL Loses Ground in 
Open Source Development, ZDNet Asia (July 2, 2009), http://www.zdnetasia.com/study-gpl-loses-ground-in-
open-source-development-62055659.htm.
45.  Rishab A. Ghosh, Open Standards and Interoperability Report: An Economic Basis for Open Standards 
8-9, FLOSSPOLS, (Dec. 2005), http://wenku.baidu.com/view/08c7ee8a84868762caaed5c4.html?from=related.
46.  However, it should be noted that Openoffice.org’s recent transfer from Oracle to the Apache Foundation 
may mean the next release will be under the Apache 2 license rather than the LGPL.
47.  See LGPL License, lIbreoffIce, http://www.libreoffice.org/.
48.  See Desktop Operating System Market Share, netMarketShare (Feb. 2012), http://marketshare.hitslink.
com/operating-system-market-share.aspx?qprid=8&qpcustomd=0.
49.  I.e., Oracle pursues an “open core” model in relation to MySQL.
50.  See ECIS Statement on the Proposed New European Interoperability Framework, euroPean coMMIttee 
for InteroPerable SySteMS [ecIS] (Oct. 13, 2010),
http://ecis.eu/documents/ECISStatementreEIF13.10.10.pdf.
51.  The purpose of the (non-binding) EIF is to provide an ‘overarching set of policies, standards and guide-
lines which describe the way in which organizations have agreed, or should agree, to do business with each 
other’ under the heading of eGovernment.
52.  See ECIS, supra note 50.
53.  For instance IBM receives around $2 billion annually from open source related revenue. See benkler, su-
pra note 5, at 47-48.
The GPL-style family of licenses covers around 65% of all open source projects 
currently on the market.44 Furthermore, if we review the main types of software packages—
both proprietary and open source—available on the market, often the main rival to the 
commercial software product is an open source product covered by a GPL-style license.45 
For instance, the main alternatives to the dominant MS Office suite are the two office 
suites, OpenOffice.org46 and LibreOffice (covered by the LGPL v3).47 One of the main 
alternatives (in terms of market share48) to the dominant Microsoft Windows PC operating 
system is Linux (covered by GPL v2). Likewise MySQL (covered by the GPL) is a popular 
open source database which competes with Oracle’s commercial offering.49 
3. rF InteroperaBIlIty StandardS and InnovatIon
Although the open source community has been among the most vocal supporters of RF 
interoperability standards, strong supporters also exist among traditional ICT companies. 
In particular the European Committee for Interoperable Systems (ECIS) is composed of 
members ‘such as IBM, Oracle and Nokia, [and] are among the most innovative information 
and communications technology (ICT) companies on the planet and include owners of some 
of the largest patent portfolios in the ICT sector’.50 During the consultation for the revised 
European Interoperability Framework51 v2, the ECIS supported an open standards definition 
which included an RF IPR policy: “to be fully open, a software interoperability specification 
may not be encumbered with running intellectual property (‘IPR’) royalties.”52
Admittedly, some of the companies which make up the ECIS rely on peripheral 
services associated with open source software as a lucrative revenue stream.53 However, 
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54.  For example, Nokia and Oracle.
55.  See generally Damien Geradin, What’s Wrong with Royalties in High-Technology Industries?, in coMPetI-
tIon PolIcy anD Patent law unDer uncertaInty: reGulatInG InnovatIon 462 (Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. 
Wright eds., 2011).
56.  See id. at 466-70.
57.  Id. at 472.
58 . See generally David J, Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Li-
censing and Public Policy, 15 reS. Pol’y 285 (June 1986), available at http://www.mbs.edu/home/jgans/tech/Teece-1986.pdf.
59.  See Geradin, supra note 55, at 469.
many do not.54 What incentives do these companies have to contribute technology to RF 
standards? Before this question can be properly answered, it is important to distinguish 
between categories of potential participants in standard-setting, each of whom have different 
incentives.
 3.1 Participants in Standard-Setting
This essay follows Damien Geradin’s identification of three main participants in 
standard-setting.55 These are pure IP companies, vertically-integrated companies and pure 
downstream companies (standard implementers). Pure IP companies do not engage in 
manufacturing (of either hardware or software), but merely produce IP which is licensed to 
produce revenues. Vertically-integrated companies engage in R&D yielding IP, as well as 
manufacturing downstream products making use of IP. Pure downstream companies only 
produce the final product, which may implement the IP produced by both pure IP companies 
and vertically-integrated companies.56 
In a standards context where the IPR licensing policy is undefined, a vertically-
integrated company has incentives to get its IP to read onto standards for two reasons. 
First, in order to tap into the potentially lucrative revenue streams of IP licensing from 
other companies making use of its IP. Second, by getting its IP to read onto a standard, 
a vertically-integrated company can raise the relative costs of implementation for its 
competitors in the downstream market for implementation. Even in the case where a 
vertically-integrated company fails to get its IP included in the eventual standard, it can still 
lower its implementation costs vis-à-vis pure downstream companies by concluding cross-
licenses with other vertically-integrated companies which were successful in getting their IP 
included.57
Pure IP companies on the other hand would seem to only have incentives to get their 
IP included in a standard in so far as they can monetize that IP directly into licensing 
fees, although there may also be some weaker incentives to benefit indirectly through 
complementary assets not essential to the standard.58 Unlike vertically-integrated companies, 
a pure IP company would not be interested in cross-licensing.59 The special threat that these 
companies present to RF interoperability standards will be assessed in section 4.1.
61IP THEORY Volume 2:  Issue 2
60.  Clearly there is a compromise between quality and price such that consumers still demand leading-edge 
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Pure downstream companies which do not have any IP clearly have incentives to lower 
their standard implementation costs as much as possible in order to maximize their final 
product margins, in so far as this drive does not affect the technological quality to the 
extent consumers are put off.60
In the following assessment of the incentives for participation in royalty-free standard-
setting, it is important to keep these categories of participants in mind.
 3.2 Fast Adoption Rates and Network Effects
One obvious advantage of RF standards from the point of view of a technology 
contributor is fast adoption rates. All things being equal, zero licensing fees over a 
standard encourage that standard’s adoption by pure downstream companies, and thus 
increases its foothold in a market vis-à-vis competing standards. If the vertically-integrated 
company owning the IP already has a downstream product on the market, then it can 
expect its market share to increase due to first-mover advantages and the natural monopoly 
characteristics and network effects often associated with standards.61 As Andy Updegrove 
has argued, these network effects:
[A]re so enormous that having even a slight advantage or head start, such 
as having your technology rather than a competitor’s included in a new 
standard, can greatly outweigh any royalties that might have been obtained 
under the old regime. Companies are therefore quite happy to compete to 
get their technology included for free.62
Clearly this model of indirect appropriation of the value from essential IPR requires that 
the company contributing the technology is also a manufacturer of downstream products. 
This argument would not apply to pure IP companies. 
 3.3 Strategic Considerations
Probabilistically it is clear that vertically-integrated companies with larger patent 
portfolios63 in the relevant field of standardization may have relatively less incentive to 
participate in RF licensing since they have a higher chance of getting essential IPR reading 
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onto the eventual standard and benefitting from the resulting licensing revenue stream or 
cross-licensing agreements (and vice-versa for companies with smaller patent portfolios). 
However, even large vertically-integrated companies may place a significant weight on 
using an unencumbered standard, particularly if the standard relevant area of technology 
has a high concentration of pure IP companies, who are uninterested in cross-licensing, 
and thus raise implementation costs for all implementers (whether vertically-integrated or 
pure implementers). If the weight placed by companies participating in an SSO on having 
an unencumbered standard is significant, then the tendency would be to drive standards 
towards non-proprietary technology in the technical committee phase of standard-setting. In 
an SSO with open participation, the “collective will” is most likely to lead to this outcome 
where, all things equal,64 among IP contributors: pure IP companies outnumber vertically-
integrated companies; and among, implementers: pure implementers outnumber vertically-
integrated companies; and where the sum of all implementers is greater than the sum of 
all IP contributors. Whether the software sector conforms to this structure is an empirical 
question, but at least one study65 points to the high potential, if not yet reality, of SMEs—
which are usually pure implementers—to attain significant concentrations in this sector. 
According to Trond Undheim, director of Standards Strategy and Policy at the Oracle 
Corporation, participants in FRAND-based SSOs in the ICT sector largely push for, and 
adopt, unencumbered or royalty-free technologies as the final standard:
The interesting thing is that, notwithstanding the fact that the 
overwhelming number of ICT standards are still created in standards 
development organizations that allow royalties to be charged, very few 
standards are ever released that do, in fact, require the payment of royalties—
even though those that have developed them often do own patents that would 
be “necessarily infringed” by a product built to their standards.66
If Undheim is accurate in his assessment, this demonstrates that there are forces at 
work—even if this essay has incorrectly identified them—which drive IP holders to 
contribute to royalty-free standardization even where their IP could potentially yield 
licensing fees. In other words, innovators (excluding, of course, pure IP companies) 
voluntarily choose to compete on implementation as opposed to attempting to capture the 
standard. 
This state of affairs would seem to suggest that direct IPR compensation in the form of 
FRAND licensing fees may well be assessed by rational companies as less lucrative than 
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73.  There are many examples of this phenomenon, including Google Docs (for Word Processing); and Spotify 
and Grooveshark (for music playing applications).
harnessing the network effects of wide RF standard implementation in the downstream 
market. The existence of these incentives may go some way to ensure that the quality of 
technology contributed to the standard is of the same value as that contributed to a traditional FRAND licensing regime.
 3.4 Mandatory RF Licensing in Practice
Few formal European and international SSOs contain mandatory RF IPR licensing 
provisions, though many explicitly provide for the possibility of RF licensing.67 The greatest 
concentration of those that do mandate RF IPR licensing is found in the software sector. 
In particular, standards relating to the Web and the Internet are almost without exception 
licensed on an RF basis.68 By and large, this is due to the RF IPR policy of the W3C, which 
creates standards for the Web, and the “preference”69 for non-proprietary and RF technologies 
of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which creates standards for the Internet back-
bone. Outside of the context of the Web and the Internet, RF standards for stand-alone client-
side software are less common, though still present. For example, the Organization for the 
Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) has an RF IPR policy “track,” 
under which the Open Document Format (ODF) was adopted (now an ISO standard70). 
Microsoft has also adopted an arguably71 “open” RF document format, Open Office XML 
(OOXML). 
Given that this essay aims to assess IPR policies in relation to the ICT sector as a whole, 
the question arises whether there is an important distinction to be made between Web 
standards and client-side software standards. It is submitted that the distinction between the 
two, though easy to support only a few years ago, is of less relevance today. The exponential 
growth of Web-enabled devices72 and the advent of cloud computing which permits Web 
applications to take over most of the functionality of client-side stand-alone software73, is 
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making the very notion of “stand-alone” computing a thing of the past. This is particularly 
visible in relation to codecs,74 the software devices responsible for encoding and decoding 
digital audio-visual information. Traditionally, such standards have been licensed on 
FRAND terms. The MPEG format for example, and which the software vendor’s lobbying 
group, the Business Software Alliance (BSA), cites75 as a successful FRAND standard, is 
ubiquitous in the ICT sector in both client-side applications and on the Web. However, 
this situation seems to be changing. The Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG), the ISO 
Working Group responsible for digital audio-visual compression codecs, such as MPEG 
and variants, announced in January 2011 that it envisages the next generation standard to be 
adopted under the ISO/IEC “type 1 licensing model,” which is royalty-free.76 It is plausible 
that this change in tact is a response to Google’s development of a new royalty-free audio-
visual compression codec, called WebM (V8), which Google and others77 intends as an 
alternative to the MPEG-4 AVC (H264) codec.78 In addition to demonstrating a shift towards 
RF licensing with respect to codecs, this example also shows the effect Web standards are 
starting to have on the licensing practices on the client-side. In short, the interpenetration 
of the Web and client-side software may be leading to a shift in the traditional “control” 
approach of the client-side towards the more “open culture”79 and RF licensing models of 
the Web. 
4. rISkS Faced By rF InteroperaBIlIty StandardS
In practice, however, even an RF IPR policy might not be enough to guarantee an 
unencumbered standard. SSOs such as the W3C also make use of provisions granting 
conditional reciprocal patent licenses, otherwise known as “non-assertion clauses” (NACs). 
These provisions work to solve a possible prisoner’s dilemma besetting patents in standards: 
that essential IPR-holders (from either inside or outside the formal/informal SSO) over a 
standard may decide to enforce their patents in any case. NACs demand that essential IPR-
holders over an RF standard grant all other essential IPR-holders free use of their IP on 
condition of mutual non-assertion.80 These provisions aim to nudge participants towards the 
cooperation/cooperation equilibrium of patent non-assertion as opposed to the defection/
defection equilibrium of a potential all-out patent war. Such provisions however are only 
effective if essential IPR-holders actually practice in the industry (are vertically-integrated). 
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It does not protect against the threat of “patent trolls”81 (also known as Non-Practising 
Entities (NPE)), or legitimate pure IP companies. For example, the Bluetooth Special 
Interest Group (Bluetooth SIG) is a consortium which licenses essential IPR over Bluetooth 
technology to all members on an RF basis, provided the member grants a reciprocal license 
for any essential IPR it may have over the standard.82 However, the enticement of an NAC 
has not prevented the Washington Research Foundation,83 a third party to the consortium 
and a pure IP company, from asserting its patents across the industry. This case serves as an 
important reminder that the “openness” of standards is always under threat, regardless of 
the character of ex ante IPR policies, even if those policies mandate royalty-free licensing.
Indeed, RF standards may well be even more vulnerable to third party patent 
infringement claims than if they were adopted under FRAND licensing conditions.
 4.1 The Challenge of IP Companies and Patent Trolls to RF Standards
One unfortunate side effect of interoperability standards adopted according to a RF 
IPR licensing policy is that it may exclude pure IP companies from participating in 
standardization as well as some large vertically-integrated companies. 
As already explained, pure IP companies follow a business model where licensing 
fees are the only revenue source. Situations can be imagined where such companies 
may nevertheless choose to contribute IP to an RF standard—as in where they expect to 
appropriate value indirectly from licensing complementary assets—but these incentives 
would be comparatively weak.84 The majority of pure IP companies would have little 
incentives to engage in RF standard-setting. By not participating in SSOs, pure IP 
companies would not be bound by the IPR policies which usually mandate, inter alia, the 
ex ante disclosure of essential IPR over a standard. In comparison, pure IP companies 
would have incentives85 to join SSOs with a FRAND IPR licensing policy and so would be 
bound by both the duty of disclosure as well as the duty not to charge excessive fees.86 At 
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the very least, the existence of RF SSOs may lead to the development of multiple competing 
standards.87 More dangerously, though, third party IP companies (both pure and vertically-
integrated) may choose to enforce their patents generally against implementers and users 
after the standard has been adopted. 
This risk is non-trivial since the SSO technical committee would not have had the 
opportunity to “design around” the IP of IP companies in a royalty-free standard.88 The risk 
is far from academic: in 2002, after the “royalty-free” JPEG was already a well-established 
image-compression standard, a company called Forgent Networks started enforcing a 
claimed patent right over technology essential to the standard.89 Before being declared invalid 
in 2006, the patent had already been asserted against more than thirty companies, raking in in 
excess of $105 million in licensing fees.90
Admittedly, the RF standards which underwrite the Web and the Internet have so far 
escaped much patent litigation.91 However, the technologies adopted as standards by the W3C 
and the IETF are highly specialized, pioneering, and relate mainly to the deep infrastructure 
of the Internet and Web. In contrast, interoperability standards such as, inter alia, document 
formats, structured data standards and compression codecs are the subject of independent 
R&D efforts by a number of private companies.92 For this reason, companies implementing 
royalty-free standards covering these areas are at higher risk of ex post patent litigation. 
Furthermore, recent years have seen a marked proliferation of pure IP companies93 as well as 
a general increase in patenting worldwide.94 These factors suggest that the risk is growing.
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5. dealIng wIth the challenge oF thIrd party Ip companIeS
Given that RF interoperability standards have a higher risk of exposure to third party 
IP litigation than FRAND standards, governments, implementers, and users must adopt a 
strategy to deal with this risk in order to maintain the openness of interoperability standards.
 5.1 Defensive Patenting
 One option would be to follow the lead of the open source community and adopt a 
strategy of “defensive patenting.” In order to protect the openness of the Linux kernel, an IP 
company called the Open Invention Network95
 has a practice of acquiring patents relevant to the kernel and arranging royalty-free 
cross-licenses with third-party patent holders in order to guarantee mutual patent non-
assertion, in a kind of “outsized” Non-Assertion Clause. The company plays a crucial role 
in maintaining the continued openness of the Linux operating system by a combination 
of the carrot of a royalty-free license to essential Linux patents and the stick of patent 
litigation.
If RF interoperability standards are to be defended in the same way as the Linux kernel, it 
would require SSO participants, as well as downstream implementers and users, to develop 
a culture of cooperation around IP management and filing patents similar to the open source 
community. This is perhaps not inconceivable given the potential for open source software 
companies to enter the market under a royalty-free licensing policy, who may well have 
incentives as well as experience of dealing with such risks. However, as in the case of 
NAC’s already discussed, pure IP companies and in particular, patent trolls, often have little 
to lose by the threat of a counter-suit. For this reason, defensive patenting would only be 
partially effective as a solution to maintaining the openness of interoperability standards.
 5.2 Competition Law Remedies
Compared to the United States, the EU has taken a stronger stance on using competition 
law to control the abuse of IP in the context of technological standards.96 In the EU 
“patent ambush” case of Rambus,97 the EU Commission imposed certain “commitments”98 
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designed to neutralize the deceptive conduct of the company, including granting “royalty 
holidays” to licensees of the essential patents, as well as royalty caps on several others.99
In the earlier EU case of Microsoft, the Court of First Instance (now the “General Court”) 
arguably applied the so-called “essential facilities doctrine” to grant a compulsory license 
to certain “interoperability information” under FRAND terms to competitors in a derivative 
market to which that information was essential to compete.100 
The European Courts’ proactive stance on maintaining the openness of technological 
standards might seem to be encouraging for the situation of third party IP enforcement over 
an RF interoperability standard which we envisage. However, certain technical legal barriers 
make reliance on competition law for a remedy highly uncertain in practice.
First, the essential facilities doctrine requires that the IP owner101 is in a dominant 
position.102 Though this could occasionally be the case, third party IP companies may very 
rarely meet this condition.103 Second, the pure IP company would need to have refused to 
license the IP. In the circumstances we envisage, it is much more likely a third party IP 
company would attempt some sort of ‘patent holdup’ against standard implementers: so 
the problem would be one of ‘excessive pricing’ rather than one of refusal to supply. Third, 
even if, as in Microsoft, the third party IP company is compelled to license its IP under the 
essential facilities doctrine, such a license would most likely be on mandatory FRAND 
terms, and would not be royalty-free. In the case of Rambus, where certain ‘royalty holidays’ 
were granted, this was on facts where the company concerned deliberately misled the SSO 
by not disclosing its essential patent applications over the standard.104 In the situation we 
envisage, the third party company would never have participated in the SSO so could not 
be accused of deception nor misconduct of any kind. Furthermore, Art 31(h) of the TRIPS 
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Agreement would likely prevent a competition authority from granting compulsory 
licensing without providing the patentee with ‘adequate remuneration’.105 This would rule 
out the possibility of compulsory licensing on royalty-free terms.
Given the above, once a royalty-free interoperability standard is successfully challenged 
by a third party as infringing its patent, competition law can offer no remedy to reinstate 
its royalty-free status. The most it could do would be to grant a compulsory license on 
FRAND terms, as was the case in Microsoft. And as in Microsoft, this remedy offers 
little in the way of respite for open source software suppliers utilizing the GPL-family of 
licenses, who would remain unable to implement the standard.106
 5.3 Patent System Remedies
In terms of remedies supplied by the patent system itself, the choices are considerably 
narrower. If we assume that the third party IP company’s patents over the royalty-free 
interoperability standard were not achieved by deception as in the case of Rambus107 or 
by misusing the patent system as in Astrazeneca,108 then very few options are available 
outside of outright patent invalidation.109 Patent invalidation, however, would depend on 
the particular circumstances of each specific case. 
Nevertheless, as in the case of the JPEG standard, patent invalidation in the context 
of software-related patents is a promising choice of action. This is because the current 
European practice110 of granting software-related patents is deficient in many important 
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respects, such as prior-art searches which only involve patent databases and occasionally 
non-patent literature.111 The cursory nature of these prior-art searches means that a great 
deal of software-related patents are probably granted which are technically invalid,112 
including perhaps those which may be relevant to interoperability standards. The UK 
Intellectual Property Office’s on-going trial of a Peer-2-Patent programme—where patent 
validity examinations are outsourced to interested external experts, such as open source 
software programmers113—is just one policy which is being investigated to try to improve 
the quality of software-related patents, and which could help in the long run to protect the 
openness of royalty-free interoperability standards.
Indeed, perhaps only real policy changes such as this will really have any effect on 
the risk exposure of royalty-free interoperability standards to third party IP infringement 
suits. This is because the risks of third party IP infringement which we envisage here are a 
result of SSO participants and technical committee’s collective inability to locate relevant 
third-party patents during patent searches; and this, in turn, was due to the search burden 
created by excess patent proliferation. If the search burden is reduced due to the systematic 
invalidation of unmeritorious software-related patents by crowdsourcing prior-art searches, 
then the patent system itself as well as royalty-free interoperability standards will be 
generally more robust.
6. concluSIon
This essay has applied pressure to the notion that RF interoperability standards are 
less innovative than standards adopted under a FRAND licensing policy. Companies do 
have incentives to contribute proprietary technology to RF standards. These incentives 
relate to the potential of network effects to increase the penetration of their end-products 
incorporating the technology which can then be indirectly monetized by selling more 
products. However these incentives do not apply to pure IP companies and some large 
vertically-integrated companies, which an RF IPR policy may well discourage from 
participating in standardization. Since these companies are excluded from RF standard-
setting, they could pose a threat to the integrity and openness of royalty-free interoperability 
standards in practice. This threat could be in the form of asserting patent claims against 
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implementers of the RF standards or by creating standard fragmentation. While defensive 
patenting in the tradition of the open source community might offer a partial remedy to this 
problem, it would require a more cooperative effort between all stake-holders who have an 
interest in keeping RF interoperability standards royalty-free. Competition law remedies 
would be difficult to rely on since although they may be able to exert some price control 
on licensing fees and prevent outright refusals to license, they would be unable to maintain 
a standard’s royalty-free status in the face of a valid patent, even if abused. To this end, 
patent invalidation remains the only sure solution against a third party claiming that an RF 
interoperability standard infringes its patent. 
In the long-run, the openness of interoperability standards could only be maintained 
with improvements to the patent system itself and some cap on software-related patent 
proliferation. The UK’s current trial of Peer-2-Patent might well be an answer to this 
problem on the policy level. In any case, if indeed royalty-free interoperability standards 
are what governments, users, and the open source software community want, they will have 
to be prepared to fight for them.  
